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Virus Detail

Win32.Poza.A

Date Published:
11 Aug 2003

Last Updated:
14 Sep 2004

Threat Assessment

Overall Risk:   None
Wild:  High
Destructiveness:  Medium
Pervasiveness:  High

Characteristics

Type : Worm

Category : Win32

Also known as:  W32/Blaster (CERT) , W32.Blaster.Worm (Symantec) , DcomRPC.exploit , W32/Lovsan (F-Secure) , W32/Lovsan.worm (McAfee), WORM_MSBLAST.A (Trend) , Win32/Poza.Worm

Immediate Protection Info

 
SignatureProductRemoval Instructions
23.62.21
eTrust Antivirus v7/8* (InoculateIT Engine)
5.x/2554
eTrust EZ Antivirus 5.x
6.x/4828
eTrust EZ Antivirus 6.1x
23.62.21
eTrust InoculateIT 6.0
eTrust Antivirus 6.0
44.21
Inoculan/InoculateIT 4.x
10.5x/4828
Vet Anti-Virus 10.5x
 
 

Description

Important Note for Users: In order to avoid infection or reinfection from Win32.Poza, it is vital that your machine has been patched to address the Dcom RPC vulnerabilty that the worm exploits. Systems running Windows XP, 2000 and NT 4.0 are vulnerable to this exploit. Please visit Microsoft to download the relevant patch at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-039.asp. You will need to reboot your machine after installing the patch in order for this update to take effect.

Cleaning Utility Available: To download ClnPoza.zip -  a utility that cleans a local machine affected by Win32.Poza, please click here.

This utility may be especially useful for those who either do not use CA Antivirus solutions, or who may be using products based on older technology that does not support system cleaning. Please view the Removal Instructions for your CA Antivirus Solution (below) to ascertain whether you require the cleaning utility.

Warning: Before running ClnPoza.com, please ensure that you carefully review the ReadMe.txt instruction file that accompanies this utility. 

-------------------- 

Win32.Poza is a worm using the exploit described in MS03-026 to gain access to unpatched Windows installations.  More information about the exploit can be found in our Vulnerabilities Library or at the Microsoft site here: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-026.asp

Method of Installation

It creates a mutex "BILLY" to avoid running multiple instances of itself, and creates a registry value to activate on Windows restart:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\windows auto update = "msblast.exe"

The worm runs a TFTP service listening on port 69 waiting for exploited machine to connect.

Method of Distribution

It starts by scanning the entire subnet for open 135 ports, then moves on to scan randomly selected class B subnets (255.255.0.0) to start scanning.  If an open 135 port is found, it uses the exploit mentioned above to gain entry and create a remote shell on the exploited machine.  It then assumes the exploit succeeded and attempts to connect to port 4444 of the remote machine.  If successfully connected, it instructs the remote machine to download MSBLAST.EXE (size: 6,176 bytes, UPX packed) from its TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) service using TFTP.EXE.  It then sends an instruction to start MSBLAST.EXE on the remote machine.

Note: TFTP.EXE is a utility included in default installations of Windows 2000 and later versions.

The worm is capable of keeping live connections to 20 exploited machines simultaneously.

The worm attempts to infect both Windows 2000 and Windows XP systems. One of the offsets used by the worm must be different for each of these operating systems, in order for the exploit it uses to work. Since the worm does not know what operating system the target machine is running, it guesses. There is an 80% chance it will attempt to exploit Windows XP, and a 20% chance it will attempt to exploit Windows 2000.

If the worm guesses incorrectly and the remote machine is vulnerable, the process svchost.exe on the target machine will crash. The system may become unstable, but the infection will fail. When svchost.exe crashes, a message like this may appear on Windows XP:

And on Windows 2000:

Windows XP systems may automatically reboot at this point.

If the worm guesses correctly and the remote machine is vulnerable, the worm will infect it. If the worm disconnects from the remote machine, the scvhost.exe process it was connected to will exit. On Windows XP, this may cause the machine to reboot, after the following message box is displayed:

In our laboratory testing, there was no obvious effect on Windows 2000 machines, except that they no longer listened on port 135.

Note: When svchost.exe crashes, Windows may create memory dumps of the process. These files are usually called user.dmp, svchost.exe.hdmp, or svchost.exe.mdmp. Because these files contain the exploit code that caused the crash, they may be detected as DcomRpc.exploit or MS03-026 Exploit.Trojan. These files are harmless, and can safely be deleted. However, the existence of these files indicates that the system was vulnerable to the exploit at the time they were created, and may still need to be patched.

Payload

If the day of the month is 16 or later, or the month is September or later, the worm creates a working thread to send multiple TCP connection requests (SYNs) to windowsupdate.com almost continuously. This effectively launches a Distributed Denial of Service attack against windowsupdate.com.

In order to attempt to create a Denial of Service state on windowsupdate.com (a condition that occurs when a system's networking resources are exhausted to the point that it is not longer able to respond to new or legitimate requests or connections), it appears that Poza attempts what is known as a SYN Flood Attack.

In order to carry out this form of attack, Poza sends one SYN TCP packet every 20 milliseconds with a spoofed random IP source address via a local port (between 1000 and 1999) to port 80 (http) on windowsupdate.com, with a random sequence number and a static window size of 16384. Please see our Glossary for further details on SYN Flood Attacks.

Additional Information

The worm body contains these strings:

I just want to say LOVE YOU SAN!!
billy gates why do you make this possible ? Stop making money and fix your software!!

Analysis by Sha-Li Hsieh, Oleg Petrovsky and Hamish O'Dea

CA Global Security Advisor

Current threat condition: Low
Low
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